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Deep rooted conflicts among key players in the Commercial
Activities (CA) program pose a major threat to its viability.
The controversies often result in litigations. This study
examines legal decisions rendered by selected judicial entities
on matters relating to OMB Circular A-76 implementation. It
identifies lessons learned and recommendations for improvements
to the CA process. The study concludes that the government has
experienced great success in litigating A-76 disputes, primarily
because the courts have taken the position that the propriety
to contract out is an executive discretion not reviewable by
them. The study recommends that government personnel should
become infinitely familiar with General Accounting Office
determinations since their decisions impact most heavily on the
daily implementation of Circular A-76.
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The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No.
A-76 (Transmittal Memorandum No. 1) dated 12 August 1985,
establishes the most recent federal policy regarding the per-
formance of the Commercial Activities (CA) program. The basic
policy is that the federal government should not start or
carry on any commercial activities to provide services or
products for its own use if such products or services can be
obtained from private enterprises through ordinary business
channels [Ref. l:pp. 1-2],
OMB has argued that when properly implemented, the present
A-76" process is an open, fair, and an effective process to
ensure that government operations are performed well and at a
reasonable price. To OMB, A-76 is sound management practice.
Does the evidence support this claim? Most participants agree
philosophically with the intent behind the CA program, that is:
. . . if contractors can provide the same services
for a lower cost, they should be considered as long
as that service is not inherently governmental and
as long as such contracting out would not contravene
other established government objectives. [Ref. 2:p. 49]
Although economic theory and common sense may strongly support
this noble goal, formulating and implementing guidelines,
procedures and processes to execute this aim is where the
opposing forces draw their battle lines, with OMB caught in the
middle of the cross fire.
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Current guidelines implementing this basic policy state-
ment have evolved from decades of confrontations between
various special interest groups within and outside the federal
government. Federal employees have provided strong arguments
to support their claims that CA policies have been historically
biased and damaging toward them and the government as a whole.
For example, the American Federation of Government Employees
( AFGE-AFL-CIO) claimed that cost comparison loopholes in A-76
are designed to allow the administration to transfer federal
sector work into the hands of supportive non-union companies
beholden to the administration regardless of cost effectiveness
[Ref . 2 :p. 52] .
On the other hand, arguments from the private sector have
been equally articulated. The National Council of Technical
Service Industries, in various letters written during 1984
concerning A-76, claimed that cost comparison studies were
subject to bid rigging by government employees so that few
commercial activities are contracted out.
The continual battle between opposing forces oftentimes
manifests itself in legal disputes. Our judicial system's
interpretation of Circular A-76 policies, procedures and
practices and the resolution of disputed issues, therefore,
become important considerations. Case law provides a wealth
of information by which future guidelines, procedures and
practices can be devised.
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B. STUDY OBJECTIVES/AREA- OF RESEARCH
The principle objective of this thesis is to identify
potential and existing problems experienced in^implementing the
CA program, OMB Circular A-76, based on an analysis of selected
legal cases. It will identify important considerations for
planning, and managing the A-76 process using lessons learned
from litigations.
C. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study will focus on legal decisions rendered by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) , Boards of Contract Appeals
(BCA) , U.S. Claims Court, U.S. Court of Claims, U.S. District
Courts, U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. It
will not focus upon disputes handled by agencies' internal
Administrative Appeal Boards (which are established under A-76
guidelines to settle certain contracting out disputes) or other
administrative boards, such as the National Labor Relations
Board. However, disputes handled by these judicial entities
may be mentioned in this research effort if they are inciden-
tal to the areas focused upon.
Agency implementation of OMB Circular A-76 involves the
effort and activities of numerous organizations within the
federal government. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity
and uniformity, the controlling document that will be used
as a basis for discussion is OMB Circular A-76 itself and not
lower level implementation instructions or directions issued
13
by the Department of Defense (DoD) or other lower tiered
federal agencies.
The scope of this thesis will also be limited as to only
those pertinent areas highlighted by an examination of liti-
gations. Pertinent areas to be addressed includes, but are
not limited to, the formulation of performance work statements,
the formulation of in-house government cost estimates, the
preparation of bid and proposal solicitations, the evaluation
of cost proposals, the awarding and execution of contracts, and
the administration of contractor performance.
It is assumed the reader has familiarity with the acqui-
sition process, particularly some basic knowledge of govern-
ment contract law.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In support of the study objectives and area of research,
the following primary research questions were addressed:
1. What key issues and problems in implementing the
program are revealed by litigations and how might
the results of these litigations be used by
government personnel to improve the A-76 process?
2. In view of issues addressed by court cases, can
distinct trends or patterns with regard to implemen-
tation be identified? If so, what do these trends
or patterns indicate?
In support of the primary research questions the following
subsidiary questions were also addressed:
1. What is the magnitude of litigations involving the
CA process?
2. How do the results of litigations impact upon the CA
process? Have litigations been a determining factor in
the formulation of published regulations and policies?
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3. What inherent weaknesses in OMB Circular A-76
guidelines are revealed by litigations? Is con-
tracting out a practical undertaking in the "real
world" litigious environment?
4. How might the results of litigations be used to
formulate practical guidelines and techniques for
successful execution of the A-76 contractual process?
5. What factors determine good performance work statements?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A computer-based file has constituted the major source of
information. Federal Legal Information Through Electronics
(FLITE) , located in Denver, Colorado, is an automated legal
research system established by the Department of Defense and
operated by the Department of the Air Force for use by all
federal agencies. FLITE' s primary purpose is to use computer
technology to help federal employees and military members ob-
tain accurate and comprehensive legal research in less time
and with less effort. FLITE does not render legal opinions
or supply legal memoranda. Its role is to provide cases, deci-
sions, statutes, regulations, and other legal references that
are relevant to the user's problem.
FLITE was searched for litigations involving the CA program
to obtain abstracts of decisions rendered by the Boards of
Contract Appeal (BCA) , Comptroller General, U.S. Claims Court,
U.S. Court of Claims, U.S. District Courts, U.S. Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. These abstracts were used
as a "first cut" to identify significant problems, trends and
issues in implementing A-76 contracts. Further screening and
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analysis of noteworthy full-text decisions served as a founda-
tion for in-depth analysis- and discussions of issues. In
addition, on site and telephone interviews with the government
and industry personnel involved in the CA process were used
to augment the aforementioned research efforts. See Appendix
for listing of interviews.
F. DEFINITIONS
1. Commercial Activity : An activity which is either
contracted or operated and managed by federal execu-
tive agency and which provides a product or service that
could be obtained from private sources. It must be
separable from other functions so as to be suitable
for performance either in-house or by contract; and a
regularly needed activity of an operational nature, not
a one-time activity of short duration. Examples of CA
include food services, health services, automatic data
processing, etc. [Ref. l:p. 2]
2. Governmental Function : A function that must be per-
formed in-house due to the intrinsic relationship in
executing governmental responsibilities. Examples
include
:
a. Discretionary exercise of government authority
such as judicial functions, management of govern-
ment programs requiring value judgment, conduct of
foreign relations, management and direction of the
Armed Services, etc. [Ref. l:p. 2]
b. Monetary transaction and entitlements such as
tax collection and revenue disbursements. [Ref. 1:
p. 3]
3. Management Study : An internal management review performed
by the government to determine the most efficient organi-
zation (MEO)
.
4. Performance Work Statement (PWS) : Specification or
description that describes output requirements of the
government in-house operation in terms of basic minimal
needs. It should also describe personnel responsibili-
ties, facility/equipment requirements, performance
standards and quality assurance plans to insure perfor-
mance by either the government or the commercial vendor.
[Ref. 3:p. III-l]
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5. Private, Commercial Source : A private business, univer-
sity, or other non-federal activity located in the
United States, its territories and possessions, or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that provides a commercial




Cost Comparison (or Cost Comparison Analysis) : An
accurate determination of whether it is more economical
to acquire the needed products or services from a
private, commercial source or from existing or proposed
government managed CA. The term "CA Study" is often
used interchangeably with the term "cost comparison
analysis." [Ref. 4:p. 1-3]
7. Privatization : Used synonymously with the term "con-
tracting out" which is allowing private industry to per-
form more of the work previously done by government
employees
.
8. Existing In-House Commercial Activities : These are CA
that are currently being performed by federal employees.
9. Expansion : An expansion is the modernization, replace-
ment, upgrading or enlargement of a government commer-
cial activity involving cost increases exceeding either
30 percent of the total capital investment or 30 percent
of the annual personnel and material cost. [Ref. 3:
p. 1-2]
10. Existing Contracts : CA activities currently performed
by contractors.
11. New Requirements : A newly established need for commer-
cial product or service. [Ref. 3:p. 1-3]
12. Breach of Contract : Prior to the Contract Disputes Acts
of 1978, a term used to refer to contractor claims which
alleged government failure to perform an expressed or
implied duty for which no relief was available under the
terms of the contract and thus fell outside the scope
of the pre-act disputes process. [Ref. 5:p. 899]
13. Civil Action : Possessing the right or the legal capacity
to influence someone's conduct through the use of civil
courts and legal procedures.
14. "Purely" A-76 issues : These are defined as issues
specifically pertaining to A-76 implementation. This
differs from incidental post-award contract disputes
covered by the Contracts Disputes Act (CDA) of 1978.
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Once a contract resulting from A-76 implementation is
legally consumated, it is treated generically like any
other contract awarded under alternative source 'selec-
tion mechanism by Boards of Contract Appeals (BCA) or
other federal courts having jurisdictionr These dis-
putes involve matters "falling under" or "relating to"
specific contracts, and not A-76 implementation.
Therefore they are not considered to be "purely" A-76
issues.
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The organization of this thesis is formatted such that the
reader can logically follow the development of lessons learned
from litigations, beginning with conditions that contribute to
controversies, and ending with the impact final determinations
have had on the CA process.
Chapter I presented a brief discussion relating Circular
A-76 controversies to case law. It also addressed the author's
objectives and research methodology.
Chapter II provides the factual and conceptual groundwork
to facilitate further meaningful discussions and in-depth
analysis. It presents a brief historical overview of the
development of the CA program, synopsizes the scope of today's
CA program, and provides an overview of the judicial system as
it relates to government contract law and CA disputes.
Chapter III presents various numerical and graphical
illustrations of the data obtained from the computerized data
base.
Chapter IV examines the legal decisions obtained from the
FLITE data base. It explores detail issues and problems in
implementing the CA program in terms of case analysis and
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findings. It also identifies various trends indicated by an
analysis of the data.
Chapter V highlights key issues
,
problems -and trends in
implementing Circular A-76, by identifying important lessons
learned. These lessons learned were derived from the detail
data analysis and findings presented in Chapter IV. Recommen -
dations for improving the contracting out process are also
provided. And finally, a brief summary, along with areas for
future research are presented.
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II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL
The Reagan Administration has repeatedly endorsed the need
for free and open competition in the marketplace to promote
a strong economy. The administration has further stated that
correct and vigorous (emphasis added) implementation of OMB
Circular A-76 policy will give the taxpayers what they deserve--
economy in government—and contribute significantly to the
recovery of the national economy [Ref. 6:p. 1] . Not surprisingly,
the CA program has become a primary means by which the adminis-
tration has attempted to achieve their goals.
The administration's support of the CA program is by no
means the only factor that influences the degree to which CA
becomes viable within the federal government. Congressional
interests, federal government employees and commercial enter-
prises have, in the history of the CA program, been major
players in shaping the policies that are expressed in the
most recent revision to Circular A-76.
Conflicts among the key players are documented by a wealth
of information. Congressional hearings, testimonies, statutes
and regulations prohibiting contracting out of certain func-
tions, revisions to the circulars, departmental implementation
instructions, etc., are just a few of the sources that may be
helpful in providing insights as to its viability. It is the
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author's opinion that lessons learned from litigations provides
another means by which the successful implementation of the CA
program can be measured and evaluated. The court system has
historically served as a forum for interpreting laws and
resolving conflicts among governmental bodies and private
citizens alike. Many times, the true test of the efficacy
of governmental policies and actions are determined by the
courts. This is particularly true in government contract law
which derives its being from "case law."
This chapter lays the factual and conceptual groundwork
to facilitate further meaningful and in-depth analysis of
lessons learned from litigations. It accomplishes this by:
1. Presented a historical overview of the CA program.
2. Briefly synopsizing the scope of today's CA program.
3. Providing an overview of the judicial system as it
relates to government contract law and CA disputes.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1 . Evolutionary Development of Circular A-76
As early as 1932, a special committee was established
by the House of Representatives to determine if the government
should continue to perform commercial functions that it began
during World War I. In 1933, this committee recommended ter-
mination of many of these in-house functions. World War II
saw a brief interruption in the move toward privatization.
However, shortly thereafter, congressional interest resurfaced.
[Ref. 7: p. 2]
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It was not until 1954, during the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration that the executive branch became a serious factor in
attempts to shift activities from government to performance by
private enterprises. In his budget address during the same
year, President Eisenhower proclaimed, the "... budget marked
the beginning of a movement to shift to . . . private enterprise
federal activities which can be more appropriately and more
efficiently carried on that way" [Ref. 7:p. 2]. Subsequently
in 1955, the Bureau of Budget Bulletin Number 55-4 was issued.
The bulletin echoed the President's basic policy and allowed
exceptions to this policy when it was not in the public inter-
est to do so. [Ref. 7:pp. 2-3]
A-76 circulars supporting this basic policy have under-
gone substantial evolutionary changes. The first Bureau of
Budget Circular A-76 was issued in 1966 [Ref. 8:p. 2]. It
differed from Bulletin Number 55-4 in that it specifically
listed five basic exceptions when commercial or industrial-
type functions were eligible to be performed in-house [Ref. 8:
p. 7] :
a. Procurement from commercial sources would disrupt or
delay a DoD program.
b. In-house performance is necessary to maintain military
training or readiness.
c. A satisfactory commercial source is not available.
d. Products or services are available from other federal
agencies .
e. Contract performance is more costly.
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The Circular was revised the following year, 1967, as
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, entitled,
"Policies For Acquiring Commercial or Industrial Products and
Services for Government Use." It attempted to address criti-
cisms that A-76 guidelines were too vague and unstructured.
It introduced numerous changes to clarify and expand upon the
methods by which in-house and contracting out cost comparisons
were to be conducted. It also required that cost analysis be
conducted prior to initiating a new start or continuing a govern-
ment function, unless in-house performance was clearly justified
by one of the other exception criteria. The heavy emphasis on
cost analysis was a major shift in contracting out policies.
[Ref. 8:p. 7]
The decade of the 1970' s continued to reflect concern
that A-7 6 guidelines and procedures were too vague and that
the implementation of these guidelines was not uniform across
all agencies. It was felt that an objective, systematic sys-
tem which would be uniformly applied was needed to insure
credibility and fairness in deciding who would perform CA.
In 1979, OMB Circular A-76 was revised to address these con-
cerns. A systematic approach was used, including the develop-
ment of performance work statements (PWS) , management study
reviews and detailed cost comparisons. The 1979 Revision
also marked the publishing of a Cost Comparison Handbook (CCH)
which provided detailed instructions for use by all agencies in
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conducting cost comparison studies of in-house versus contrac-
tor's costs. [Ref. 8:pp. 9-10]
The 4 August 1983 version of A-76 (and-its most recent
update, Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, dated 12 August 1985)
revised much of the guidance promulgated in the 19 79 Cost
Comparison Handbook. The cost comparison methodology was
changed from the complex full cost method to a simpler incre-
mental approach. It shortened the cost comparison form from
32 to 17 lines. Many of the complex cost computations that
were often contested were either eliminated or replaced by
standard cost factors. [Ref. 9:pp. 9-10]
2 . Key Players and Their Special Interests
a. General
Revisions to A-76 have reflected the need to accommo-
date the desires and interest of diverse and conflicting groups
both within and outside the federal government. A keen appre-
ciation of who these groups are and their positions with regard
to the CA program is important because it underlies the "grass-
roots" issues that fuel the controversies surrounding the
program. It also provides an appropriate framework for dis-
cussions of resulting litigations.
Major combatants in the A-76 environment include
such diverse groups as OMB "'(representing the executive branch
interest), Congressional Subcommittees, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) , federal civil service employees and their
associated trade unions, and private trade associations.
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These groups can be simplistically categorized as advocates
for contracting out, such as private trade associations,
and opponents to contracting out which quite naturally include
groups representing civil service employees,
b. Congress
Congress was initially an advocate of contracting
out. Their recent actions strongly suggest that they now
oppose many of the program's policies. For example, during
hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources conducted
20-25 September 1984, the Chairman, Congressman Don Albosto
of Michigan expressed "... concern about the impact of con-
tracting out on the performance of certain government activi-
ties and on the ability of federal agencies to properly perform
their missions" [Ref. 2:p. 2]. He questioned whether current
CA guidelines properly identified which activities were inher-
ently governmental in function and were therefore exempt from
contracting out. He also expressed concern as to whether cost
studies properly reflected accurate costs of in-house versus
contractor performance. In particular, he was concerned about
the effects contracting out had on the federal work force,
considering the duty the government has as a responsible
employer. Other more tangible actions have demonstrated
Congressional opposition:
(1) The 1983 Defense Authorization provided a 6-month
moratorium on any new contracting out in that
department. [Ref. 2:p. 39]
(2) The Veterans Compensation, Education and Employment
Amendment of 1982 prohibited contracting out certain
activities in the Veterans Administration. [Ref. 2:p. 39]
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(3) The fiscal year 1983 continuing resolution prohibited
GSA from contracting out certain functions.
[Ref. 2:p. 39]
c. Government Employees and Their Unions
The grassroots opposition to contracting out can be
traced directly to federal employees. The American Federation
of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, the largest federal sector
union representing over 700,000 employees, has spearheaded the
opposition. The union claims that revisions to A-76 have pro-
gressively worsened the situation for government employees by
making it easier to convert in-house CA to contracts and that
contracting out was only a ploy used by the administration to
hide personnel cost from Congress and the public. They contended
that current cost comparison policies were flawed because the
total cost to the government of contracting out was not being
recognized.
These loopholes in cost comparison studies (some-
times referred to as hidden costs) include inadequately weighing
[Ref. 2:pp. 49-50]
:
(1) The cost of lost accountability.
(2) The quality of services.
(3) The cost of increased uncertainty resulting from
contractors' bankruptcies, cost overruns, strikes,
etc.
(4) The cost of lost knowledge from a stable work force.
(5) Future governmental and social cost resulting from
inadequate or nonexistent pension plans for con-
tract employees.
(6) Dynamic long-term costs such as contractor buy-in




Private industry have provided strong support for
the philosophical goals of CA,that is, that government should
not be in the business of competing with its citizen for the
production of commercial goods and services. However, they
have also been equally critical of the specific means by which
A-76 has tried to achieve that goal. Industry believes that
the government agencies have continued to delay identifying,
scheduling, and conducting cost comparison studies. They
cite numerous improper actions conducted by agencies to dis-
courage contracting out, including administrative harrassment,
inaccurate PWS , and "devious" cost accounting. [Ref. 10:
pp. 1-2]
e. Office of Federal Procurement Policy
As the prime implementor of A-76, the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has argued that CA assures
open and fair competition and that through it, the American
public is getting the best value for their tax dollars. They
have tried to dispell criticism that the administration is
using A-76 to reduce the federal civilian sector by professing
that the circular does not mandate contracting out but rather,
".
. . it recognizes that a dedicated, career federal work
force is one of the government's most valuable resources, and
it established a means for enhancing Federal productivity by
challenging managers to find the most effective and efficient
means of doing business at competitive prices" [Ref. ll:p. 5].
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C. SCOPE OF THE CURRENT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM
1. Status of Commercial Activities Within the Federal
Government
An OMB survey of federal agencies in 19 81 found that
approximately $6 billion in annual operating costs, $3 billion
in capital investment and 226,000 positions were devoted to
government operated CA subject to A-76. These CA positions
represented about 10 percent of the federal civilian workforce,
Approximately $14 billion worth of activities classified as
CA are not included in the above inventory due to exemption,
mainly because of national defense reasons. [Ref. ll:p. 9]
In March of 19 85, OFPP reported that almost 1,700 cost
studies have been conducted since 1979 resulting in average
savings of 20 percent over the previous cost of CA to the
government, regardless of whether federal employees or contrac-
tors won the competition. They also concluded that it was
more economical to retain about 45 percent of the CA in-house
after internal management reviews, with the other 55 percent
of CA converting to contracts. [Ref. ll:pp. 1-8]
Although Circular A-76 requires completion of cost
reviews on all inventoried CA by 30 September 1987, only 22
percent have been reviewed during the past five years. OMB
is projecting that full implementation of Circular A-76 would
result in savings exceeding $1 billion per year by 1988. [Ref,
ll:pp. 1-8]
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2. Status of Commercial Activities Within the Department
of Defense (DoD)
The CA program is very important to the operation of
DoD. Many of the commercial activities are base support
services crucial to military readiness. They include activi-
ties such as intermediate and depot maintenance, health
services, and automatic data processing. Since DoD has the
majority of CA within the federal sector, it represents the
prime area to generate potential cost savings. DoD experiences
with A-76 has shown positive results:
In April 1984, the DoD reported to Congress that
contracting out saves money, helps small business and
cost few employees their jobs. According to the report,
contracts let between 1980 and 1982 saved the govern-
ment about $250 million, roughly a quarter of the cost
of in-house work. In addition, about 79 percent of the
contracts went to small business and only 6 percent of
the federal employees displaced by contractors were unable
to retire or find another job with either the government
or the contractor. [Ref. 6:p. 2]
Table 2.1, summarizes fiscal year 1984 DoD commercial
activities workload, by DoD components. It shows that 172,000
(34 percent) contract workyear equivalents associated with
DoD commercial activities were performed by contractors . On
the other hand, 333,000 workyears (66 percent) of DoD commer-
cial activities were performed by DoD civilian and military
personnel. [Ref. 12:p. 4]
Table 2.2, summarizes -"fiscal year 1984 estimates of
the total workload associated with major categories of DoD
commercial activities. Note that depot maintenance accounts
for the largest portion of CA (83,000 workyears) followed by
other nonmanufacturing (78,000 workyears). [Ref. 12:p. 5]
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. TABLE 2 .
1








Army 87 (60) 59 (40)
Navy/Marine Corps 189 (80) 48 (20)
Air Force 34 (35) 63 (65)
Defense Agencies 23 (92) 2 ( 8)
Total DoD 333 (66) 172 (34)
Source: The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)
TABLE 2 .
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Historical data for fiscal year 1985 is not yet avail-
able. However, Table 2.3, is a projection for fiscal year
1985 DoD commercial activities workload, by DoD component.
It estimates approximately 50 5,000 CA workyears. Coinci-
dentally, this is the same number as for fiscal year 1984.
[Ref. 12 :p. 15] For fiscal year 1985, DoD also anticipated
that it would complete comparison studies involving 10,000
end strengths and that 50 percent of the completed studies
would result in contracting out. [Ref. 12 :p. 15]
TABLE 2 .
3













Army 86 (59) 60 (41)
Navy/Marine Corps 186 (78) 51 (22)
Air Force 33 (34) 64 (66)
Defense Agencies 23 (92) 2 ( 8)
328 (65) 177 (35)
Source: The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)
In summary, the potential for cost savings in DoD is
substantive. CA in DoD seems to impact heavily in the area of
base support operations. Based on past experience and the
projections for fiscal year 1985, additional CA business for
both large and small businesses are foreseeable.
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3. Commercial Activities Guidelines and Procedures
Implementation of Circular A-76 requires an inventory
of all agency activities to determine which functions are CA
and subject to A-76 policies and to review those so identified
to decide whether they will be performed in-house or by con-
tractors. Agencies are also required to update their CA
inventory annually and to make the lists available to the public
upon request. Cost studies are conducted on existing in-house
commercial activities, expansions, existing contracts and new
requirements
.
A cost study review consists of the following [Ref. 3:
pp. IV-1,2,3]
:
a. Defining the goods and services required by the
government and the quality standards that must be
adhered to. These requirements are expressed in PWSs
which are supposed to emphasize the minimum output
levels required by the government rather than speci-
fying how the work should be performed. PWSs also
establishes the baseline which the government and the
contractor use to submit subsequent bids.
b. A mandatory internal CA managerial study is conducted
on the in-house organization to identify essential
functions to be performed, determine performance fac-
tors, and determine organizational structure, staffing
and operating procedures for the most efficient in-
house performance of commercial activities.
c. Competing contractors are solicited to submit bids on
the PWS established by the government.
d. Contractor bids and the government in-house cost esti-
mates are evaluated in accordance with the CCH to
determine the most efficient bids.
e. An appeal period is established whereby protesters may
present their cases to an Administrative Appeals Board.
f. After the appeals process, either a contract is awarded
or the solicitation is cancelled and the function is
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retained in-house to be performed in accordance with
the MEO.




Disputes involving Circular A-76 implementation are, by
statute, resolved in the federal judiciary system, thereby
precluding any discussion of state and local court systems.
The Contract Disputes Act (CDA) of 1978, the Federal Courts
Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982 and the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921 are three prime pieces of legislation that have signi-
ficantly impacted the jurisdiction and organization of our
modern judicial system as it relates to civil disputes involving
federal activities. Accordingly, a brief review of these pieces
of legislation will facilitate a basic understanding of how
disputes relating to Circular A-76 are litigated.
2
.
Contracts Disputes Act of 1978
The CDA of 19 7 8 establishes a comprehensive framework
for the resolution of disputes between the government and con-
tractors under certain covered government contracts [Ref. 13:
p. 2]. These disputes are sometimes referred to as "post-
award" contract disputes because it applies to issues arising
subsequent to contract award. It is also applicable to express
or implied contracts of executive agencies or certain non-
appropriated fund activities (Exchange Services only). [Ref. 13
p. 2]
Under the pre-act system the contractor had limited
direct access to federal courts to resolve disputes because
33
only breach of contract cases could.be appealed under the
Tucker Act of 1887 [Ref. 14:p. 145]. Other shortcomings in
the pre-act disputes process were prevalent:
The disputes process was a curious melange of contract
clauses, procuring agency regulations, judicial decisions
and statutary coverage without any comprehensive legisla-
tive scheme. The disputes procedures were based on
executive agencies issuing specific contract provisions
detailing administrative dispute procedures. Agency Board
of Contract Appeals were traditionally appointed by,
reported to, and were paid by the agency involved in the
disputes. These in-house boards often decided cases
concerning action by senior officials in the same agency.
[Ref. 14:p. 145]
Under the CDA, the contracting officer's authority was
broadened to include matters relating to the contract as well
as matters arising under the contract, thereby eliminating the
restrictions imposed by the "breach of contract" limitations.
It allowed for the creation of full-time agency boards and
gave expanded jurisdiction and powers such as the authority
to administer oaths, authorize depositions and discovery pro-
ceedings and to subpoena witnesses and documents. It also
allowed the contractor direct access to the federal court
system and established a systematic process by which a dispute
is handled in the judiciary system. Figure 2.1 provides a
sequential flowchart (including time allowed for various
appeals) of the dispute process set forth in the CDA of 1978
as amended by PL 97-164 (FCIA of 1982) . The chart illustrates
that a dispute first requires a Contracting Officer's final
determination, which can then be appealed through various liti-
gative channels. Another distinguishing feature of the CDA of
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Figure 2.1 Disputes Process —Contracts Disputes
Act (CDA) of 1978
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or interpretation of contract terms or other relief. It is
important to note at this point, the additional duties per-
formed by Agency Boards of Contract Appeals, outside the realm
of the CDA. Some boards, such as the Interior Board of Contract
Appeals and the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals, also
serve as Administrative Review Boards under A-76 disputes
procedures
.
3. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 USC 71)
The Competition and Contract Act (CICA) of 19 84 has
recently provided the General Accounting Office (GAO) with
specific statutory authority to decide contractor protests
against award (sometimes referred to as pre-award or bid pro-
tests) . However, GAO has always possessed and exercised these
powers under the general authority to audit and settle accounts,
provided under 31 USC 71. Many of the practices and procedures
developed by GAO in the past have now been codified unchanged
by CICA. Although the majority of protests against contract
award are filed directly with GAO, protesters may also file
directly in a federal court. [Ref. 15:pp. 13-14]
4
.
Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982
The CDA of 1978 and CICA of 1984 do not provide cover-
age for all controversies between the government and other
parties. As previously mentioned, civil disputes involving
matters not arising under, or relating to a specific contract
are not subject to these acts. They are litigated under the
"regular" federal judicial review procedures. An example of
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this type of civil suit would be the case where a veteran sued
the federal government because he lost his veteran's preference
position as a result of a CA study.
Prior to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reoraniza-
tion Act of 1980, the federal judicial system consisted of
various courts and review bodies as reflected by Figure 2.2.
Note from the figure the sequence of appeals and the jurisdic-
tion of the various bodies. The reorganization act revised
this system by splitting the Fifth Circuit Court into two
appeals courts thereby resulting in 12 U.S. Courts of Appeal.
The FCIA of 1982 further revised the system as follows:
a. Eliminated the specialty courts (i.e., Court of Customs
and Patent Appeal, and Court of Claims) by combining
and incorporating them into a 13th appeals court, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This addi-
tional appeals court was established to handle appeals
of cases requiring special expertise in certain fields
(such as government contracts, customs and patents)
which were nonexistent in the other appeals courts.
b. Established the Claims Courts to handle trials/
adjudications and to "enter dispositive" judgments
for claims against the government. This authority
differs from that of the former Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims was only authorized to issue
recommended decisions.
A flow chart of the present judicial system, as midofied is
illustrated by Figure 2.3.
5 . Summary
Disputes involving Circular A-76 implementation has
various channels within the federal judiciary system by which
they can be litigated. Post-award contract disputes of matters
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handled by agencies' Boards of Contract Appeals or other federal
courts specified in accordance with the CDA of 1978. Bid
protests are normally filed with the GAO under—the CICA of
1984. However, protesters can also file suit in the Claims
Court for relief. Other civil suits not falling under the
jurisdiction of the CDA of 1978 or the CICA of 1984 are handled





As previously mentioned, data used in this study were pri-
marily obtained from the FLITE data base. For the purpose of
this study, FLITE' s data are defined as digests, slip opinions,
and excerpts or full text copies of judicial decisions. The
amount of data obtained was influenced by the "search strategy"
used to extract legal decisions and the extent of legal deci-
sions located within FLITE 's data base. FLITE uses a word or
group of words (referred to as key word(s) index) to search
resources within its own system or accessed other legal systems
including JURIS, LEXIS, WESTLAW, DIALOG, LEGI-SLATE and REG-
ULATE. The combined resources of FLITE and other accessible
legal systems includes federal, state, military court decisions,
administrative agency decisions, statutes, pending regulations,
law review articles, and many nonlegal data bases of interest
to attorneys [Ref. 16 :p. 3] . The search strategy consisted
of:
1. Restricting the search to decisions rendered by GAP ,
federal courts , and Boards of Contracts Appeals .
2. Utilizing keywords index of "contracting out" and
"A-76."
This strategy reflected a general search pattern that was de-
signed to capture the maximum number of decisions involving
A-76 implementation as confined by stated restrictions.
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Alternative research methods, such as manual searches and
personal interviews were also used to augment data obtained
from FLITE. Although not presented in this seetion, informa-
tion gathered by these alternative methods are reflected in
Chapter V.
B . DATA
The voluminous nature of the data obtained precludes dis-
playing it in its entirety in the text of this study. Instead,
numerical summaries are illustrated by the following tables and
figure.
Table 3.1 is a breakdown, by judicial entities of the number
of decisions rendered. References are also provided indicating
specific legal texts used to compile the data base. Since
a "global" search of all decisions relating to A-76 was con-
ducted, with no restriction as to specific time frames, the
dates noted refer to cases actually searched and not cases
found. Also, note that only 11 Boards of Contract Appeals
(BCA) decisions were obtained. The lack of BCA data is directly
attributable to a weakness in the research methodology rather
than the "actual" number of BCA cases litigated. Further dis-
cussions of this flaw in the research methodology are presented
in Chapter IV.
Table 3.2 presents the same data in a different format. It
illustrates the results of litigations in terms of cases decided

















Vols 56-2 thru 70-2, July
1956 thru Nov 1970; Vol 71-1
thru 81-2, Nov 19 70 thru Oct
1981; Vol 82-1 thru 83-2,
Nov 1981 thru Sep 1983;
Unpublished Aug 19 84 thru
Jan 1985 11
U.S. Claims Court Reporter, Vols 1 thru 6
(p. 565) Oct 1982 thru
Mar 1985
U.S Court of Claims Vols 1 thru 229, Oct 1863
thru Feb 1982
U.S. District Court Federal Supplement Vols 1
thru 605, Aug 1932 thru
Mar 19 8 5
U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Reporter 2D series




Supreme Court Reporter Vols
96 thru 105, Jul 1975 thru
May 19 85; U.S. Reports Vols
1 thru 422, Sep 1754 thru
Jan 1975
206
Source Author's Research Data
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.TABLE 3.2



















U.S. Court of Claims
U.S. District Court
U.S. Court of Appeals
U.S. Supreme Court
TOTAL 177 25
Source: Author's Research Data
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Figure 3.1 is a graph of the frequency of distribution of
decisions with respect to the passage of time. Further dis-
cussions of the data in Table 3.1, 3.2, and Fi-gure 3.1, are





What issues and problems in implementing the Commercial
Activities program are revealed by litigations? What is the
magnitude of litigations involving the CA process? In view of
issues addressed by court cases, can distinct trends or patterns
with regard to CA implementation be identified? What are some
of the factors that determine good performance work statements?
These questions are applicable portions of the primary and
subsidiary research questions which will be dealt with by this
section of the study. They have been restated herein, to
redirect the reader's attention on some of the major objectives
of this study.
Note that the first question is related to an issue raised
by one of primary research questions. However, this question
will be dealt with on a more detailed level of analysis than
the primary research question envisions. Chapter V will sum-
marize key issues and problems based on the detailed analysis
and findings presented herein.
Discussions of analysis and findings are also organized
around the decisions rendered by judicial entities. These
entities consist of GAO, Boards of Contract Appeal, U.S.
Claims Court, U.S. District Courts and U.S. Court of Appeals.
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B. MAGNITUDE OF LITIGATIONS
1. "Purely" A-76 Issues
*
As illustrated by Table 3.1, a total of 206 legal
decisions were obtained from FLITE. Based on the extensive
data base accessible by FLITE and the global search pattern
used (i.e., The search pattern was not restricted to any time
frame. In some instances, recorded decisions, as far back as
the year 1863 were searched.), it is assumed that the data
obtained approximately represent the sum total of all Comp-
troller General (Comp Gen) , Boards of Contract Appeals and
federal courts recorded decisions rendered on "purely" A-76
issues
.
2. Other Than "Purely" A-76 Issues
Decisions rendered by Boards of Contract Appeals and
other litigations appealable to higher federal courts under
the CDA of 1978 are excluded from this assertion for reasons
which follow. When FLITE scans legal decisions stored in
data bases, it searches for the key word(s) or patterns of
key words specified in the search strategy. If those word(s)
or patterns of words are not found in the legal text, it
cannot extract the data. In situations involving purely A-76
issues, judges are likely to mention "A-76" or "contracting
out" in their written decisions. This provides a reasonable
assurance that the search strategy could obtain the necessary
data.
On the other hand, decisions falling under the auspices
of the CDA of 1978 are not purely A-76 issues. For these same
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reasons, judges are only likely to mention "A-76" or "contract-
ing out" in passing when writing up their decisions. As a
result, BCA and federal courts decisions rendered under the
CDA of 1978 are not fairly represented in the data obtained.
3 . Summary
An in-depth analysis of the 206 decisions obtained
revealed that 201 involved purely A-76 matters. The remaining




Data Presented in Table 3.1
Approximately 86 percent of the decisions were rendered
by GAO. No decisions were rendered by the U.S. Court of Claims
or the U.S. Supreme Courts.
2 Data Presented in Table 3.2
Table 3.2 indicates an interesting phenomenon. Approxi-
mately 86 percent of the cases were decided in favor of the
federal government. The federal government in this case being
agencies of the executive office such as OMB and OFPP or other
executive agencies responsible for implementing and executing
A-76. Approximately 12 percent of the cases were decided
against the government and the remaining 2 percent were split
decisions
.
3 Data Presented in Figure 3.1
A rough correlation between the number of A-76 decisions
per year (i.e., decisions rendered by GAO, BCA and federal
courts) with respect to the passage of time is displayed
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graphically by Figure 3.1; The graph clearly shows that the
rate of decisions per year has increased with the passage of
time. A dramatic acceleration in the rate occurred between
1979 and 19 80 (more than doubled) , and has continued throughout
1984.
The year 1955, in lieu of 1967, might appear to the
reader to be a logical starting point for the display of data
since it marked the publication of the executive branch's first
policy on CA. However, no legal decisions were found preceeding
1967. Therefore the years between 1955-1966 were not shown on
the graph. Also the reader should note that calendar year 1985
was discounted for analysis purposes, since, because of timing
reasons, it includes incomplete data.
A possible reason for the acceleration in rate of
decisions in the later years can be. explained by exploring the
relationship between the rate of litigations and the chrono-
logical development of A-76.
Evidence accumulated by the author's research strongly
suggests that few A-76 actions were made in the initial stages
of A-76 implementation. No empirical data could be found to
support this assertion because it appears that, prior to 1980,
inadequate statistical records were maintained on CA. For
example, it was not until 1981, with the passage of the Depart-
ment of Defense Authorization Act, 1981 (P.L. No. 96-342 (1980)),
that the DoD was required by Congress to report on the perfor-
mance of CA [Ref. 12:p. 2]. However, the following quote is
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illustrative of the types of evidence found to support the
author's claim:
It [A-76] had been on the books but it had been com-
pletely ignored, and we now had statutory responsibility
in OFPP to see that the policy was properly imple-
mented. As we looked at what had been done in most
agencies, we found that . . . there was clearly no
management direction in the agencies placing any
priority at all on implementation of this policy.
[Ref. 2:p. 5]
With the creation of OFPP in 1974, serious attempts to
"fully" implement A-76 policies were made for the first time
in 20 years [Ref. 2:p. 5]. As changes were made to improve
upon the process and increasing emphasis on its implementation
continued, the magnitude of contracting out increased. For
example, in DoD alone, over $350 million in annual cost savings
were generated from the 1979 version of Circular A-76. [Ref. 2
p. 128]
The author concludes that the lack of contracting out
activities during the initial stages of the CA program may
have contributed to the lower rates of legal decisions during
earlier years, since opportunities for disagreements were
minimal. Conversely, the increase in A-76 activities during
later years may have created an environment where the oppor-
tunities for disagreement between key players flourished.
Logically, a corresponding acceleration in the rate of litiga-
tions would have followed, particularly during the years after
1979, when the Reagan Administration took office.
4 . Summary
A clear majority of litigations were decided by GAO.
Some of the courts rendered no decisions at all.
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The federal government was highly successful in liti-
gating A-76 protests.
The acceleration in the rate of A-76 1-itigations appears
to correlate with the increasing emphasis on the CA program.




GAO decisions represent the overwhelming majority
(approximately 86 percent) of the cases obtained through FLITE.
General trends previously mentioned are therefore mirrored by
GAO data.
2 Methodology
Each of the 178 cases was individually analyzed to
determine issues, problems and weaknesses of CA implementation,
policies and procedures. The data obtained from the analysis
were synthesized into various categories or groupings for pre-
sentation. Categories consisted of headings such as: GAO
jurisdiction, evaluation of cost estimates, conflict of interest,
etc. Only pertinent findings were highlighted herein. They
were chosen based upon the frequency of occurrence or the
importance a decision had on the A-76 process. It was also
noted that this same methodology was used for analysis of BCA
and federal court decisions.
3 General Accounting Office Jurisdiction
a. Conditions for GAO Jurisdiction
The Comptroller General involvement in the CA pro-
gram involves settling certain bid protest disputes resulting
52
from CA implementation. The Comptroller General will entertain
protests when a protester alleges ,faulty or misleading cost
comparison between the in-house estimates and -contractors bid.
In a landmark case, Crown Laundry and Dry Cleaners Inc., B-
194505, July 18, 1979, they highlighted their reasons for
entertaining such protests:
. . . We would consider it detrimental to the govern-
ment to decide to award or not award a contract based
on a cost comparison analysis that did not conform to
the terms of the solicitation under which offers were
solicited.
The Comptroller General has on occasion applied
this same rationale for hearing cases that on first appearance,
seem to be outside its bid protest authority. For example,
in Space Age Engineering, Inc., B-209543.2, April 19, 1984,
the Comptroller General reviewed a protest that a contract was
improperly terminated. Contract terminations normally involve
contract administration and therefore fall under the CDA of
1978. However, the Comptroller General considered the protest
because the basis for the agency's action to terminate resulted
from an alleged deficiency in the initial contract award. So,
whenever the competitive bidding system is at issue, the Comp-
troller General will generally hear the protest. [Ref. 17]
b. Conditions Precluding GAO Jurisdiction
On the other hand, the Comptroller General has
consistently expressed and upheld conditions under which it
will not review protests. It has repeatedly refused to render
decisions concerning the propriety of an agency's determination
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under A-7 6 to contract out in-house work. The Comptroller
General's position is that the question as to whether an agency
of the executive branch of the government may -perform commercial
activities in-house or contract with commercial contractors
for such products or services was not covered by any specific
statute, regulation or instruction which would place a decision
of this type under the legal jurisdiction of the Comptroller
General. [Ref. 18]
The Comptroller General has further stated the
following
:
The directives incorporated in Bureau of the Budget
Circular No. A-76, are matters of Executive policy,
prescribed by the Bureau of Budget as the agent of the
President designated by executive order No. 8248 of
September 8, 1939, to assist the President in the
formulation and administration of the fiscal program
of the government and to advise the Executive Departments
and agencies in the areas of administrative organization
and practice. . . . Thus, the propriety of determination
by an executive agency ... is not a matter permitting
ruling in terms of legal rights and responsibilities. We
therefore find no legal basis for objections to the
proposed administrative action, and we must decline to
rule upon the policy question involved, which we deem to
be a matter for legal resolution within the Executive
Branch. [Ref. 18]
The impact of this particular position is crucial
because it has far reaching effects on other related judicial
reviews. For example, federal courts are not bound by Comp-
troller General determinations. But they often rely on Comp-
troller General decisions as precedence in matters relating to
governmental contract issues. Related situations whereby the
Comptroller General has refused to review protests are de-
tailed by the following fifth-order headings.
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(1) Federal Employee/Labor Union Protest. Comp-
troller General has applied the doctine that determinations to
contract out under OMB Circular A-76 are a matter of executive
branch policy and therefore bid protests filed by federal employees
or their representative unions are not reviewable by GAO. This
position was expressed in decisions, Sidney R. Jenkins, B-217045,
November 27, 1984 and American Federation of Government Employ-
ees, Local 1662, B-214123, February 7, 1984. The former case
involved a bid protest filed by a foreman employed at the water
and sewage plant at Fort Detrick, Maryland. He contested the
Department of Army decision to contract for services instead
of performing them in-house. The Comptroller General dismissed
the protest by saying it only considers A-76 protests which
allege faulty or misleading cost comparison of in-house estimates
with bids received. It further stated that:
This protects the competitive system by assuring that
a cost comparison analysis conforms to the terms of the
solicitation under which bids were submitted. This excep-
tion is narrowly drawn, intended to protect parties that
have submitted bids from the arbitrary rejection of their
bids and does not extend to non bidders. [Ref. 19]
The Comptroller General concluded that Mr. Jenkins was not a
bidder and therefore his protest was not reviewable by them.
Basically, the same findings were expressed
in the latter case. Here the Comptroller General determined
bid protests filed by unions, employees or taxpayers were also
not reviewable.
(2) Procedural Matters . The Comptroller General
will not normally consider protests that it considers "procedural"
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in nature. Issues involving such things as scheduling of a
post-award debriefing falls under this category. In a re-
lated case, PAN AM World Services, Inc., B-215.208.5, December
10, 19 84, the contractor, among other things, protested con-
tract award on the basis that the agency refused to hold a
debriefing. The Comptroller General dismissed this portion
of the protest and concluded that scheduling of debriefing was
procedural in nature and did not affect the validity of the
award.
4 . Legislative Agency/Administrative Office of U.S. Courts
The Comptroller General has determined that legisla-
tive agencies and administrative offices of U.S. Courts are not
governed by OMB Circular A-76 policies applicable to executive
agencies. In Comptroller General decision Photo Data, Inc.,
208272, March 22, 1983, the contractor protested the Government
Printing Office (GPO) cancellation of the solicitation. The
protester argued that any decision of the GPO to perform the
work in-house rather than resoliciting should have been done
in accordance with A-76. The Comptroller General denied this
protest and further stated that whenever GPO performs printing
work for executive agencies, it does so under its own authority
and is thus not an agent for an executive agency.
In a related decision, Datars , Inc., B-199437, November
12, 1980, the protester contended that a government (i.e.,
Administrative office of the U.S. District Court) estimate of
cost to perform work in-house did not adhere to A-76 standards.
The Comptroller General deemed the protest irrelevant because
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the estimate was prepared by an administrative agency of the
,U.S. Courts and was therefore not subject to A-76 which is
directed to heads of executive departments and-establishments
.
5 . Revisions to Circular A-76/Ef fective Date
Determining the appropriate Circular A-76 revisions to
be used for a particular cost study requires a careful analysis
of the circumstances surrounding the specific situation. There
are no set, iron-clad rules. Ordinarily, where the solicita-
tion fails to indicate specific standards to be used in con-
ducting cost comparison under OMB Circular A-76, offerors may
assume that the procuring agency will apply the published
procedures in effect at the time, not those previously effec-
tive. [Ref. 20] However, where the application of the
standards in effect at the time would have resulted in erroneous
cost comparison, GAO will not object to the agency's use of
prior standards.
The complexity of this issue is aptly illustrated in
a series of related Comptroller General hearings Homes and
Narver Services, Inc., B-212191, November 17, 1983, and Morrision
Knudsen Company, Inc., B-212191. 2, April 17, 1984. In the
former hearings, the contractor protested that the Army erron-
eously determined that TM-6, modification to Circular A-76
(Revised) dated 29 March, 1979, was inapplicable because TM-6
was officially implemented by the Army on July 27, 1982, three
working days before the receipt of initial offers. The solici-
tation was subsequently amended three times. The Comptroller
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General sustained the protest primarily because they felt the-
Army had ample time to comply with the new regulations.
However, on a reconsideration of the i-nitial decision,
B-212191.2, the Comptroller General reversed the decision. The
Comptroller General concluded that the "... prior decision
was based on the premise that because TM-6 was in effect when
offers were submitted for these procurements, it should be
applied in order to assure a proper and fair cost comparison"
[Ref. 21], Because it later became clear that the application
of TM-6 would have resulted in erroneous cost comparisons, the
Comptroller General concluded that the Army's initial decision
was appropriate.
The Comptroller General has also determined that:
a. Agencies are not required to use certain A-76
cost comparison revisions when waivers have been
granted by higher commands and amendment to RFPs
informed all concerned of procedures to be used.
b. Agencies granting of waivers to revised A-76 provisions
are at executive agencies discretion and not review-
able by GAO.
6. Performance Work Statement/Statement of Work (PWS/SOW)
a. Needs Established by Agency
Typically GAO will not question an agency assess-
ment of its needs as expressed in the PWS/SOW unless the pro-
tester can show that the agency's determination of needs are
clearly unreasonable. The burden of proof falls squarely on
the shoulders of protesters. This basic premise has been a
difficult obstacle for protesters to overcome although seemingly
convincing arguments have been advanced.
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Dyneteria, Inc., B-211525.2, October 31, 1984
illustrates this point. The contractor protested the Air
Force decision to cancel invitations for bids -{IFB) after bid
opening because they felt the agency did not have legally
sufficient justification. The solicitation was issued to
meet the requirements for fuels management operation at Kelly
Air Force Base for a base year and two option years. Subse-
quent to the issuance of the IFB , the procurement office
learned that an anticipated increase in the requirement
was necessary because of an anticipated change in the mix
of aircraft to be stationed at the air base. As a result,
the contracting officer cancelled the IFB because the original
scope of work no longer reflected the activity actual mini-
mum needs. The protester argued that the decision to cancel
was based upon estimates of projected or anticipated changes
in needs and not on actual increased requirements. Therefore,
the Air Force justification did not meet the "cogent and com-
pelling" standard to justify post bid cancellation.
The GAO denied the protest and reiterated its
basic hands-off policy with regard to agency determination of
needs ". . .as long as it reflects a reasonable judgment
based upon the investigation and evaluation of information
reasonably available at the time the decision is made" [Ref. 22
b. Revision of Specifications
Sometimes solicitations contain specifications
which misstate the needs of the agency or the procuring agency
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decides that a less expensive approach than provided for in
the bids is possible. Reissuance of revised specification
may be in the best interest of the government.— However,
protesters have argued that in A-76 cost studies agencies
are, in effect, competitors with contractors. Revisions to
specifications and cancellations should be closely scrutinized.
GAO has, for the most part, treated these situations as the
agency's right to determine its need and has decided accordingly
c. Ambiguous/Inadequate Specifications
GAO has generally determined that SOWs set forth
in solicitations as inadequate when it does not sufficiently
advise offerors of the tasks to be performed and the defi-
ciency could have materially affected their bids. For instance,
offerors were not told of tasks performed by existing con -
tracts , rather than by in-house employees. This misconception
often resulted in distorted bids covering these contracted
efforts. GAO recommendations usually result in resolicita-
tion or a recomputation of cost estimates taking into account
the distortion. However, whenever ambiguous/inadequate SOWs
have no material impact on the cost comparison outcome, GAO
will dismiss the protests.
7 . Adjustments/Recomputation of Cost Estimates
OMB Circular A-76 specifies that the government in-
house estimate and the contractor's bids/proposals shall be
based on the same PWS . GAO have held that the government may
be justified in properly adjusting its estimates, even after
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bid opening, if it is discovered that the estimate materially
-
deviates from the scope of work specified in the RFP or IFB
[Ref . 23]
.
In Trend Western Technical, Corp., B-212410.2, December
17, 1983, the protester alleged that, when the government esti-
mate is found to be non-responsive to an IFB or RFP, it should
be disqualified. No adjustment should be made by appeals
boards. In reply, GAO asserted that the government estimate
provides a standard against which bids and proposals are evalu-
ated. As such, its estimates are not subject to the normal
bid and proposal rules such as responsiveness and competitive
ranges. The GAO has also allowed agencies to adjust their
in-house cost estimates when:
a. It is discovered that the government in-house cost
estimate was not prepared in accordance with the
applicable Cost Comparison Handbook.
b. Higher agency directives (other than OMB Circular
A-76) appropriately allowed for inflation adjustment.
On the other hand, the Comptroller General has sustained
protests against cancellation of solicitations when the
government alleged that cancellation was appropriate because
its in-house cost estimates were not based on the solicita-
tion's scope of work and GAO concluded that the agency could
have easily adjusted its estimates.
8 . Evaluation of Cost Estimates
a. Conflict of Interest
Protesters charges of government employee conflict
of interest have been difficult to prove. In all cases the
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protesters must be able to clearly substantiate their claims.
In D-K Associates, B-213417, April 9, 1934, charges were
alleged that their proposal was not fairly eva-luated because
all members of the evaulation committee were employees of the
base who would be affected, at least indirectly
,
by the A-76
decision. GAO found nothing that indicated the evaluators
acted inappropriately.
GAO will not attribute bias to an evaluation panel
simply on the basis of inference or supposition. GAO does not
believe that a conflict of interest is created simply as a
result of an evaluator having routine dealings with the organi-
zation subject to the cost study review [Ref. 24]. Even in
situations where the evaluator' s job was directly in jeopardy,
conflict of interest protests were not upheld when the evalua-
tor ' s role was limited or actual prejudice was unlikely because
of other extenuating circumstances. [Ref. 20]
b. Evaluator 's Judgment
In reviewing protests alleging improper evaluations,
GAO will not substitute its judgment for those of evaluation
boards. GAO has given evaluation boards a wide range of dis-
cretion and will only examine the record of a particular case
to determine whether judgments made were reasonable and in
accordance with listed evaluation criteria and procurement
regulations
.
GAO has given the government the benefit of the
doubt when disputes exist on a question of fact. When the
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only evidence present consists of contradictory assertions,
GAO has stated the protester has not lived up to the "burden
of proof" doctrine.
9
. Adequacy of In-House Estimates
GAO views the validity of the government cost estimate
as solidified when certain conditions are met:
a. The in-house estimate must be based on the same
PWS/SOW as was specified in the solicitation.
b. The agency must comply with procedures specified
in the solicitation for conducting the cost com-
parison study. Failure to comply casts doubt on
the validity of the in-house estimate and ultimately
the outcome of the cost comparison evaluation.
When these basic conditions have been met, it becomes difficult
for protesters to successfully litigate charges of improper
in-house estimates.
Other factors, such as materiality, documentation,
and independent validation of in-house estimates, play impor-
tant roles in assuring the reliability of in-house estimates.
While the protester bears the burden of proving that an A-76
cost comparison was materially deficient, the agency should
identify and document all elements of the cost comparison.
Otherwise, protesters may meet their burden of proof when the
agency's failure to do so reasonably places the outcome of the
evaluation in doubt. [Ref. 25]
10 . Fairness in Management/Cost Studies
A primary argument used by contractors in protesting
A-76 cost studies is that the government has unfair advantages
in preparing their in-house estimates. The Comptroller General
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has recognized that the government may have inherent advan-
tages in an A-76 exercise.
It is well-settled that while the government and
offerors must compete on the same statement of work,
they may be subject to different legal requirements
in obtaining or performing contracts that may cause the
commercial concerns to suffer a cost disadvantage.
[Ref. 26]
As long as the ground rules for conducting cost comparison
studies set out in the solicitation and the Cost Comparison
Handbook are adhered to, the protester's disagreement is a
question of executive policy which GAO will not review. GAO
will not question the fairness of the ground rules themselves
A summarization of key GAO decisions are provided
below to illustrate the type of determinations they are
inclined to render:
a. Inaccurate historical workload data provided by
the government to bidders to estimate performance
cost is not, by itself, a basis for sustaining a
protest. This is particularly true when the data
was not a precise prediction of intended workload
or actual cost incurred. GAO has based its decision
on the premise that bidders should use the PWS as
the principal basis for calculating costs and not
historical costs. [Ref. 21]
However, if historical costs are provided, both
the government and the contractor should use the
same historical cost base. For example, the agency
is not allowed to provide bidders with 1981 histori-
cal workload data while the government uses 19 82
data. [Ref. 21]
b. The agency's access to its installation, employees
and other generated information is not a privilege that
must be given to bidders. This inherent advantage
is similar to the advantage enjoyed by an incumbent
contractor. Likewise, A-76 procedures do not
address the elimination of the government advantage.
c. Agencies may have inherent advantages in organizing
its manpower that cannot be duplicated by contractor.
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The agencies reliance on this advantage in estimating
its cost is allowable.
11. Administrative Appeals Boards
a. "Interested" Parties
In Contract Service Company, Inc., B-2107.96,
August 29, 19 83, the National Federation of Federal Employees
and a Navy employee questioned certain aspects of a cost com-
parison study. The Navy's Administrative Appeals Board subse-
quently revised the government in-house cost estimate as a
result of an extensive review of the cost comparison documents
The contractor protested the board's action to the GAO. The
protester alleged that the board improperly revised the govern-
ment in-house estimate because the revision was based on an
appeal by a local union and a government employee and not by
"interested" parties. The term, "interested" parties, is
defined as one who has a legitimate interest in the outcome of
a particular CA cost study.
The GAO denied the protest. The GAO concluded
that Circular A-76 and related regulations allow bidders and
affected parties such as employees and their unions to make
appeals to the Administrative Appeals Board. [Ref. 27]
b. Composition of Administrative Appeals Board
Protesters, on occasion, have disagreed with the
composition of Administrative Appeals Boards. When the solici-
tation or other referenced documents do not set forth any
criteria for the composition of boards, GAO will not sustain
such protests.
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c. Exhaustion of -Agency's Administration Review
Procedures
The Comptroller General has consistently determined
that it will not consider protests until the protester has
exhausted the contracting agency administrative review proce-
dure set forth in the solicitation. Thus, if a protester
fails to raise an objection to a cost comparison study with
the Administrative Appeals Board, GAO will decline to review
it.
d. Agency Refusal to Comment on Appeals of Board's
Decisions
Agencies have used internal regulations as a defense
for not commenting to GAO on issues raised in protester's
appeals of board's decision. In particular, the Navy has used
DoD Instruction 4100.33, "Operation of Commercial and Indus-
trial-Type Activities," as justification. This instruction is
an intra-agency regulation that implements Circular A-76 within
the Department of Defense. Paragraph 9c of the regulation
states that "... the administrative review is not subject
to our negotiation, arbitration, or agreement with affected
parties . . . .
"
As a result, the Navy has argued that discussing
issues of the administrative review or the propriety of its
final determination were precluded. In these cases, GAO will
make determinations based on the facts at hand. Where pro-
tests are sustained, GAO will not reconsider the agency request
to now provide information related to the case.
66
12 . Miscellaneous Findings
a. General
These findings are categorized as -miscellaneous
because they deal with issues that are narrower in scope and,
in many cases, have already been indirectly addressed by pre-
ceding findings. They are separately highlighted because of
their impact on A-76 cost estimates and evaluations.
b. Depreciation/New Equipment Cost
Depreciation on new equipment can be computed from
the time such equipment is budgeted as opposed to starting from
the time the equipment is actually installed. Agencies have
considerable discretion in determination of depreciation
schedules as long as they are based on reasonable assumptions
or mandated regulations. I,t is reasonable to use budget esti-
mates as an evaluation figure for new equipment purchases as
long as actual needs exist and the agency has taken steps to
obtain the necessary funding. [Ref. 28]
c. Administrative Cost
GAO has upheld the DoD policy excluding G&A and
certain other overhead expenses (i.e., underutilized personnel
costs) from the government in-house estimate when the govern-
ment's cost is essentially the same, whether or not the
activity is contracted out. These "sunk" costs do not affect
the in-house estimates unless contracting out would eliminate
a whole man-year of work from outside the work center. [Ref. 26]
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d. Direct Labor Cost Determination
Cost comparison under A-76 should be based upon
direct labor rates anticipated for federal emp-loyees during the
first year of the performance period rather than federal pay
rates effective during the earlier period of applicable wage
determination. [Ref. 20]
It is inequitable for the government to estimate its
cost on a straight line basis while the contractor's cost esti-
mates include anticipated labor cost increases that are not
otherwise reimbursable by equitable adjustment clause. The
reverse is applicable to the government. For example, in con-
struction contracts containing the Davis Bacon clause, the
government should not inflate its in-house construction labor
costs if the contract allows for equitable price adjustments.
[Ref. 21J
The Cost Comparison Handbook mandates that inflation
factors should not be applied to salaries of government employees
subject to the Service Contract Act (SCA) . GAO has acknowledged
that applying the provisions of the SCA is a complex matter.
For example, a supervisor who performs an excessive amount of
"non-exempt" work may be a working foreman subject to the SCA,
rather than an exempt bonafide executive. Nevertheless, GAO
has determined that agencies, in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Labor, have the responsibility for making this deter-
mination which GAO will not ordinarily question unless shown to
be unreasonable. [Ref. 21]
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e. Employment Outlook/Retained/Severance Pay-
According to GAO, agencies are not required to use
past statistics or actual experience of employment opportuni-
ties for federal employees affected by contracting out in
estimating retained and severance pay. A-76 guidance only
suggests that they may use historical data and only requires
that agencies make an estimate of the impact of contracting
out a function. Therefore GAO views the agencies estimation
as largely a judgmental matter. A protester's disagreement
with an outlook for employment does not, by itself, invalidate
the agencies forecast. Even if the agency's estimate turns out
wrong, at worst, it exercised poor judgment and is not subject
to GAO overturn. [Ref. 28]




U.S. Claims Court decisions represent approximately
2 percent of the cases obtained through FLITE. Their decisions
seem to be in consonance with GAO determinations.
2 Methodology
Cases were analyzed and findings were developed using
the same methodology as was utilized for GAO decisions.
3 Adjustments to In-House Estimates
The 1979 and 1983 versions of the A-76 Cost Comparison
Handbook allow the government to correct errors discovered in
its cost estimate after bid opening, under certain conditions.
This policy was consistently upheld by GAO. The reasoning
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behind allowing adjustments results from the overriding pur-
pose of A-76, which is " . . . to assure the most economical
performance of federal activities through a comparison of the
estimated cost to the government of acquiring a product or
service by contract and of providing it with in-house,
government resources" [Ref. 30].
The Claims Court agrees with and adopts the reasons
underlying the GAO decisions. Absent pervasive and compelling
evidence presented by protesters, the court will allow agencies
to reestimate their bid to correct certain deficiencies.
[Ref. 30]
4 . Legislative Agencies
The Claims Court reiterates the position that OMB
Circular A-76 is not binding on legislative agencies, per se.
However, the Court has also ruled that there are exceptions
to this rule. For example, in Internal Graphics, Division of
Moore Business Forms v. U.S., 4CL. CT. 186(1983), GPO (a legis-
lative agency) incorporated the principles of the A-76 Cost
Comparison Handbook in their solicitation as the method of
determining whether a printing function would be retained in-
house or contracted out. The solicitation was subsequently
cancelled and International Graphics protested. One reason
being that GPO did not adhere to A-76 Cost Comparison Handbook
guidelines in determining the successful bidder. GPO aruged
that the contractor could not protest on this ground because
A-76 was not binding on legislative components.
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However, the Claims Court concluded that because the
principles of the A-76 Cost Comparison Handbook were incor-
porated into the solicitation, as a matter of -law, such prin-
ciples become terms of an implied contract of fairness between
the government and the contractor. Because GPO deviated
from the Cost Comparison Handbook in such a way that provided
no rational basis for evaluating the bid, their cancellation
action was deemed improper. [Ref. 31]
5 . Revisions to Circular A-76/Ef fective Date
Interpretations by the Claims Court have implied that
the Circular revision in effect as of the date of bid submission
should be utilized. However, the courts also seem to provide
the government wide ranges of discretion in deciding which A-76
revision to utilize when a recent revision has been effected.
[Ref. 30]
6 . Claims Court Jurisdiction
The court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction
over suits brought by employees or unions representing them,
to enjoin the government from awarding contracts under A-76.
The Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982 confines their
injunctive authority to contract actions such as equitable
adjustment of bid protests. Non-bidding parties, threatened
with economic injury from the award of government contract,
are not "contract claims." Therefore remedies should be pur-
sured in the District Courts under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) of 1976. [Ref. 32]
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7 . Conflict of Interest
Allegations of conflict of interest among government
employees involved in A-76 cost comparison studies have been
argued by protesters in terms of actual bias and the appearance
of impropriety . The Claims Court has taken the position that
agency procurement officials enjoy significant discretion in
evaluating bids and proposals. Their judgment will not be
questioned unless it was clearly demonstrated by protesters
to be arbitrary or without rational basis. The courts have
also concluded that inference of conflict of interest cannot
be substituted for the required clear and convincing proof.
One must present "clear and convincing evidence" to overcome
the presumption that government employees have acted conscien-
tiously in the performance of their duties. [Ref. 31]
For example, in Space Age Engineering, Inc., v. United
States, 4 CL. CT. 739(1984), the court determined that the
mere fact that a project manager on a competing bidder's pro-
posal had retired three years earlier as director of supply at
an Army depot which had solicited bids under an A-76 cost study,
did not result in a conflict of interest. The courts concluded
that conflict of interest was not a serious concern because
the director had retired prior to the cost analysis, SOW
preparation and in-house bid preparation. Furthermore, his
involvement in the A-76 study, as director, was limited to
actions of a general nature.
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F. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1. General
Only 3 percent of the cases obtained through FLITE were
U.S. District Court decisions. There was no discernible trend
apparent from the data, except that decisions covering rela-




Cases were analyzed and findings developed using the
same methodology as was utilized for GAO decisions.
3 Freedom of Information Act (FQIA) of 1966 (as amended)
Agencies have used Exemptions 5 of the FOIA to delay
the release of documents related to its in-house cost esti-
mate to prospective bidders. Exemption 5 allows the with-
holding of documents from the public which a private party could
not discover in litigation with the agency [Ref . 33] . In deciding
FOIA complaints involving the applicability of Exemption 5 to
certain documents withheld, the courts rely on two tests
[Ref. 33]
:
a. Whether the documents would be routinely or normally
disclosed upon a showing of relevance.
b. Do the documents contain sensible information not
otherwise available and if immediate release of these
[documents] would significantly harm the government
monetary functions or commercial interest.
In a related case, Morrision-Krfudsen Co., v. Dept of
the Army of United States 595 F. SUPP 35.2(1984), the agency
withheld documents related to its own historical costs because
they relied on these documents substantially to prepare its own
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bid. The agency felt that the government would be placed in
a competitive disadvantage by releasing them prior to bid
opening. One of the prospective bidders protested the agency
decision to the District Court. The court agreed with the
Army's view that the requested documents contained sensitive
information which would significantly harm the A-76 program if
released prior to bid opening. The Army, therefore, had met
its responsibility of demonstrating sound reason to protect
the "commercial" information sought by the protester.
4 . Court Jurisdiction
It appears that District Courts have been inconsistent
in determining whether they have the authority to review agencies'
right to contract out a function under Circular A-76. In
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1858 v.
Callaway, 398 F. Supp. 176(1978), the court held that it had
jurisdiction per the APA. However, in American Federation of
Government Employees v. Hoffman, 427 F. Supp. 1048(1976), they
determined that the matter of contracting out was a matter of
agency discretion beyond their judicial review. In one recent
case, International Association v. United States Department of
the Navy, 536 F. Supp. 1254(1982), the court reversed itself,
again, by stating that it had jurisdiction to review these
types of litigations.
The court's inconsistency seems to depend upon their
interpretation of the APA as it relates to A-76 and to what
extent agencies managerial decisions involve military matters
and national defense issues.
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The APA allows the District Court to review an agency's
action, except where statutes prevent judicial review or the
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. At
times, the courts have taken the attitude that judges are not
in the business of running the military services and that
orderly government requires that the judiciary exercise discre-
tion when it interferes with legitimate military matters. In
these situations, the courts have felt that judicial review in
the procurement process has been narrowly prescribed. [Ref. 34
Lately, the District Courts have taken the opposite
view. When the courts believe that an agency's decision does
not require superior knowledge and experience of military pro-
fessionals and the issues involve compliance with existing
regulations, they are more inclined to assert jurisdiction.
[Ref. 35]
According to some courts
:
Limited inquiry into an agency's compliance with
regulation is proper. As the courts reasoned in
Derecktor , such an inquiry is an acceptable compromise
between judicial abdication of responsibility to review
the regulatory process and substitution of a court's
views on the merits for those of the agency. [Ref. 35]
5 . Federal Employee/Labor Union Protest
The court's position on federal employees and their
unions right to maintain suit against contracting out appears
to parallel the court's position on its jurisdiction to review
agencies decisions. In other words, if the courts determine
that they have the right of judicial review, then, they have
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also maintained federal employees rights to bring suit. The
reverse is also apparently true.
The courts have expressed the opinion -that the APA
fosters the presumption of judicial review to government employees
suffering legal inequity because of agency actions. The review
of agency action should not be deterred unless there is com-
pelling reason to believe that Congress intended such action.
[Ref. 35]
An opposite position expressed is that A-76 is a mana-
gerial and policy tool, which does not provide government
employees legal rights to sue under the APA [Ref. 34].




Only 2 percent of the decisions obtained through FLITE
were U.S. Court -of Appeals. The Court of Appeals decisions
tended to be consistent among the various appeal courts and
from one period of time to another.
2 Methodology
Cases were analyzed and findings developed using the
same methodology as was utilized for GAO decisions.
3 Court Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has consistently held that agency's
decision to contract out was an agency discretion of law, not
subject to judicial review. The courts have reasoned that A-76
decisions involve military and managerial activities and
expertise inherently unsuitable for review by the judicial
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system. The APA did not provide government employees and





Appellants have contended that the Veterans Preference
Act protects veterans from being replaced by private sector
employees. However, the Court of Appeals has dismissed these
suits, stating that veterans are entitled to have retention
preference over other civil service employees but not employees




The court has generally upheld the "exhaustion" doc-
trine. It requires protesters to utilize the internal adminis-
tration appeals process prior to appealing to higher judicial
bodies. However, they have also indicated that administrative
remedies are not required if the process is inadequate, futile
or serves no purpose. [Ref. 37]
6 Collective Bargaining Agreements
The courts have upheld agencies rights under Title VII
of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The act provides that
the obligation of agencies to bargain with union negotiators
over the condition of employment does not pertain to the
agencies exercise of its management rights. In other words,
agencies can reserve the right to contract out and to determine
the personnel to perform a function. [Ref. 38]
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BCA determinations represent only 5 percent of the
decisions obtained through FLITE. 6 out of the 11 decisions
resulted from the board functioning as an A-76 administrative
review board. These decisions are classified as purely A-76
issues. The remaining 5 decisions were issued under the
jurisdiction of the CDA. Findings presented reflect purely
A-76 issues only. Data obtained on post award disputes did
not reveal any problems or issues pertinent to OMB Circular
A-76.
2 Methodology
Cases were analyzed and findings developed using the
same methodology as was utilized for GAO decisions.
3 Prohibition Against Contracting Out
Boards have consistently determined that they will not
review protests against cost comparison studies pursuant to
A-76 when Congress has enacted statutes prohibiting the award
or when no specific appropriation has been provided to fund
the award. According to the baord, issues were made "moot"
by such congressional actions. [Ref. 39]
V. LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS/SUMMARY
A. GENERAL
This chapter identifies lessons learned and recommendations
which are drawn from the data presented in Chapter IV. In
doing so, it ties together portions of the primary and subsidi-
ary research questions dealt with in the previous chapter and
the remaining portions of the research questions that are yet
to be answered. Since key concepts and objectives of this
study are also embodied in the following discussion, it is
recommended that the readers reacquaint themselves with the
primary and subsidiary research questions.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
The preponderance of litigations involving purely A-76
matters are decided by the Comptroller General under their
bid protest authority . This particular trend is highlighted by
Table 3.1, located in Chapter III. The number of litigations,
alone, suggest that GAO has played a major role in shaping the
legal environment surrounding A-76. Their involvement is
likely to remain substantive, considering the evolutionary
changes that Circular A-76 will continue to experience and the
resulting conflicts that are likely to ensue.
The CICA of 1984 has also solidified future GAO influence
on CA. Not only has it statutorily codified prior GAO authority,
it has also expanded the remedies available to protesters.
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Remunerating successful protesters for court costs and providing
a mechanism for suspending contract award or performance,
pending resolution, are a few. As a result of—CICA, protesters
may be incentivized to pursue litigations under bid protest
procedures more vigorously.
The Federal government has experienced great success in
litigating A-76 protests . Their won/loss record, as demon-
strated by Table 3.2, reveals that protesters chances of
successfully litigating their positions on purely A-76 matters
have been extremely dismal. The low success rate can be
attributed to a myriad of factors. One possibility is that
government personnel involved in CA have done a very good job
in adhering to A-76 implementation rules and guidance, at
least in terms of "legal soundness." Another likely possibility
is that protesters are prone to litigate issues regardless of
its legal merit. Either protesters feel that they have nothing
to lose, or perhaps, they are lacking in knowledge concerning
A-76 procedures and government contract laws.
The data indicate that GAO and the courts allowing the
government wide ranges of discretion in judgmental issues
significantly influences protesters success rate. The over-
whelming burden of proof is on the protester to show that the
government acted capriciously or unreasonably. Historically,
protesters have not had great success in doing so.
Perhaps the competency of Administrative Appeals Boards
has affected the government success rate. Most litigations
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must first be reviewed by • the boards prior to appeal to GAO
or the federal courts. It is possible that the boards have
screened out many of the cases in which the government position
was unsupportable.
The overwhelming position of the Comptroller General and
federal courts is that they will refuse to render decisions
concerning the propriety of an agency's right to contract out
under A-76 . Their arguments for this position are based pri-
marily on the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The act stipulates that courts cannot review an agency's action
where statutes prevent judicial review or where an agency's
action is committed to agency discretion by law. The court's
contention is that A-76 is not covered by a specific statute
and, therefore, are matters of executive discretion and policy.
On a few occasions, the U.S. District Courts have deviated
from this basic position. However, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
have, in fact, nullified these deviations by consistently
affirming the executive agency's right to contract out under
A-76.
The implications of the courts determination that it lacks
jurisdiction to review the propriety of A-76 are far reaching.
Federal employees and their unions are not within the "zone of
interest" to file suits with the GAO or federal courts. They
can only file protests with Administrative Appeal Boards. In
essence, only prospective bidders under bid protest action are
allowed judicial review.
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An agency failure to comply with the procedures specified
in the solicitation for conducting cost comparison studies
casts serious doubts on the validity of the outcome . When
this situation occurs, it becomes much easier for protesters
to meet the "burden of proof" doctrine. Common errors made by
agencies include:
a. Failure to base their in-house estimates on the
same PWS/SOW as specified in the solicitation.
b. Failure to adequately document their in-house
cost estimates.
Nevertheless, discrepancies made by agencies that are
procedural in nature or do not materially impact the validity
of the outcome are ignored.
Legislative agencies and administrative offices of the
courts are not bound by A-76 policies, per se . Circular A-76 is
directed to heads of executive agencies only. However, if
A-76 procedures are incorporated into solicitations as a means
to determine whether to contract out, as a matter of law,
these procedures become binding on the legislative and judicial
bodies
.
The effective dates of revisions, by itself, does not
determine whether it is binding on a cost comparison study .
This dilemma has fostered confusion among industry and govern-
ment personnel which can eventually result in needless litiga-
tions. A-76 circulars provide that revisions are effective
upon publication and shall apply to all studies in process
where cost comparison decision has not yet been approved.
[Ref. 3:p. 3]
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Court's decisions have sometimes dictated otherwise. The
applicable revision depends upon the circumstances of each
issue. Some rules of thumb are helpful in making the appro-
priate choice:
a. The revision set forth in the solicitation usually
provides the baseline from which to work.
b. Subsequent approved revisions should be utilized,
provided that there is enough time to revise the
solicitation prior to the specified bid/proposal
receipt date.
c. Whenever a solicitation fails to indicate specific
standards to be used, the revision in effect as
of the date of bid submission is appropriate.
d. Resulting erroneous cost comparison studies or higher
level/agency waivers can also affect the appropriate-
ness of a revision.
The adequacy of performance work statements/statements
of works are issues commonly litigated . Determination of an
agency's actual needs is a favorite issue protesters have
pursued. They are also likely to question any revisions to
specifications made by the government. The courts will
generally not question an agency determination of its needs,
unless the protester demonstrates them to be clearly unreason-
able. Results from litigations have shown that this is
difficult to do. Agencies are usually justified in revising
their specification whenever they misstate their needs.
Inadequate PWS/SOW will normally be determined when the
solicitation provides for contractor work that is not actually
performed by in-house personnel and vice versa.
Agencies are allowed to adjust or recompute their in-house
cost estimates after bid/proposal opening. The courts have
83
proclaimed that the government estimates are not bound by the -
normal bid and proposal rules, such as competitive ranges and
responsiveness. As such, adjustments to in-ho-use estimates are
the preferred method to correct errors, rather than cancella-
tion and resolicitation.
Evaluation boards enjoy a significant amount of discretion
in evaluation cost estimates . Courts will not substitute their
judgments for the judgments of the evaluation boards. In
this respect, conflict of interest claims are diffulct to prove
The appearance of impropriety is not sufficient to prove con-
flict of interest even in cases where the government evaluator
job was directly in jeopardy of being contracted out.
The courts will not question the fairness of Circular A-76 .
They have recognized that the government enjoys certain inher-
ent advantages. These advantages include:
a. The use of Exemption 5 under the FOI . The govern-
ment is allowed to delay releasing certain documents
related to its in-house estimates to prospective
bidders until after bid opening.
b. Agencies access to its resources (i.e., facilities,
information, etc.) which is not a privilege that
must be given to bidders.
c. Agencies advantages in organizing its manpower and
resources, and reporting costs in such a way that
cannot be duplicated by contractors.
As long as the ground rules established for conducting
studies are adhered to, protesters disagreements are a matter
of executive policy not reviewable.
Protesters must exhaust all administrative remedies prior
to judicial review by GAO or the federal courts. Failure to do
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so will result in dismissal of protests. The courts are appar-
ently trying to make sure that issues are resolved at the lowest
possible level. No data were available to demonstrate the
magnitude of issues resolved in the Administrative Appeals
Boards. However, there were few cases appealed from either
the GAO, U.S. Claims Court or the U.S. District Courts to the
U.S. Court of Appeals.
Collective bargaining agreements cannot preclude the
agency's right to contract out . The courts have upheld the
agency's right under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
GAP decisions are consistently applied . It is the author's
opinion that they can be relied upon as precedence for the
outcome of future conflicts. On occasions, federal courts
have utilized GAO expertise in bid protests to assist them
in rendering their decisions.
GAO will not be deterred from rendering decisions when
agencies refuse to provide relevant information . In these
situations, GAO will make a determination based on the facts
on hand. Motions for reconsideration by agencies are usually
denied
.
Congressional prohibitions against contracting out have
not been overturned . These prohibitions can be placed into
effect by the enactment of statutes or regulations, or the
failure to fund a contracted effort.
C . RECOMMENDAT I ONS
Government personnel responsible for formulating and
implementing A-76 policies and procedures should become
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infinitely familiar with GAP decisions . By far, GAO has had the
most impact on the day-to-day activities of conducting cost
comparison studies. An analysis of the data indicated that
their influence will continue in the future. By recognizing
the GAO's position on issues, government personnel may be
able to avoid the pitfalls that result in protests and unsuc-
cessful litigations. They can also use results of GAO decisions
to assist in obtaining that "competitive edge" necessary to
formulate winning in-house cost estimates.
The issuance of bulletins, which provide results of per-
tinent legal decisions to activities involved in CA studies,
can play an important role in educating government personnel.
Greater emphasis must be placed on ensuring that cost studies
are conducted in accordance with applicable A-76 guidelines.
Increased training and oversight are important, particularly
in the area of PWS/SCW preparation, cost estimation, and
documentation. Failure to follow applicable guidelines and
to document what was done may invalidate winning in-house bids.
The wasting of precious resources occurs whenever cost compari-
son studies must be redone.
Solicitations should always specify the applicable A-76
documents that are intended to be utilized for a cost compari -
son study . The A-76 circular, supplements, lower level depart-
ment instructions and the effective revision should be cited.
Any deviation or waivers from these documents should also be
indicated. This would eliminate a lot of confusion as to the
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ground rules for conducting A-76 studies. Whenever possible,—
the agency's position on how they intend to handle subsequent
revisions would be helpful.
Agencies should ensure that their union contracts contain
language which reserve their management rights to contract
out . The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 provides this
right to agencies. It appears that the absence of such
language in the collective bargaining agreement may jeopardize
the agencies position, if the union claims that their union
contract prohibits such contracting out.
Circular A-76 Supplement (Revised 1983) Part I, Chapter
II, paragraph 1(2) and (7) needs to be clarified . Paragraph
1(2) provides that appeals procedures do not authorize an
appeal outside the agency or provides for a judicial review.
GAO and the federal courts have supported this position with
respect to government employees and their unions. But their
actions strongly suggest that this provision has been ignored
when protesting bidders are involved. For example, GAO and
the Federal courts have consistently determined that protesters
must first exhaust the administrative appeals process prior to
judicial review. This language seems to indicate that they
have de facto appeal rights from A-76.
Paragraph 1(7) provides that decisions of an appeal are
not subject to negotiation, arbitration or agreement. Agen-
cies have occasionally used this as a defense for not responding
to GAO request for information concerning appeals from
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Administrative Appeals Board's determinations. GAO has con-
sistently demonstrated their resolve to render decisions on
the facts on hand, irregardless of the agencies position.
Adhering to guidelines that place agencies at a disadvantage
in judicial reviews is counter-productive.
Adjustments to government in-house estimates should be done
when mistakes or errors are found after bid/proposal opening
and the adjustment can be easily made . GAO position is that
adjustments, rather than cancellation of solicitations, are
appropriate when circumstances dictate. Agencies should be
aware that cancellation of solicitations merely to forestall
contracting out decisions will likely be protested and sustained
by GAO.
Emphasis on government sponsored workshops should be a
mainstay of efforts to reduce potential litigations . Workshops
will enable the government to more thoroughly educate potential
bidders concerning the rules and guidelines of A-76. This
will be particularly helpful for small businesses or other
businesses not familiar with the complexities of A-76. The
workshops will also assist in establishing open communications
between the government and industry. Better educated bidders




The history of Circular A-76 has been marked by a continual
struggle between diverse groups, both within, and outside the
federal government. Disputes between opposing forces have
often resulted in litigations. Based on an analysis of the
data presented, it appears that litigations have had some
impact on the formulation of published regulations and policies.
But more importantly, results of litigations have dramatically
affected the actual execution of the A-76 process. Practical
techniques and procedures related to the "real world" litigious
environment are revealed. Important considerations for develop-
ing most efficient organizations, in-house cost estimates, and
evaluating bids and proposals are some of the issues explored
by litigations. These are most important to the practitioner
when conducting A-76 cost studies.
With the increasing emphasis on contracting out to promote
savings and efficiency in the federal government, past experi-
ence suggests that legal decisions will continue to play an
important role in the viability of the CA program. It is the
author's opinion that one series of related decisions rendered
by GAO and federal courts hold the key to the success of the
CA program in the future. The courts have consistently main-
tained that "contracting out is an executive discretion not
reviewable by them" [Ref. 36]. This position has handcuffed
all attempts by federal employees and their union to attack
the viability of Circular A-76 through the judicial process.
Time and again, AFGE has sought to enforce A-76's own language
in court, only to be met by OMB objection that Circular A-76
has no force of law or regulation. [Ref. 2:p. 45]
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Just as importantly, the court's position has also provided
the government with the "upper hand" in litigating bid protests.
Many of the issues involve agency judgments, which the courts
will generally not question. Even the fairness of A-76 proce-
dures, themselves, are not subjected to review.
Based on the foregoing data, and analysis and findings, it
is concluded that contracting out is a practical undertaking in
the real world litigious environment , as long as the courts
maintain their present position concerning propriety of agencies
right to contract out.
E. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Based on the results of this study, further research in
the following areas are recommended:
1. Lessons learned from litigations involving post-award
contract disputes
.
2. Future patterns of litigations involving quality
assurance on base support service contracts.
3. The impact of Congressional involvement on CA.
4. Developing strategies and practices to enhance the
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